ARMS CONTROL

-AND

COOPERATIVE SECURITY

edited by

Jeffrey A. Larsen James J. Wirtz

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


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Foreword

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A fter two decades of dramatic change, an updated introduction to arms control and cooperative security is long overdue. Political, economic, demographic, and technological transformations around the globe require us to stay on a steep learning curve. In parallel, an equally steep "forgetting curve" grows deeper as the lessons of the past recede with declining memories of the substance and context of the arms control agreements that peaked in the early 1990s.

These challenges—learning what is different and remembering what is important—make solving contemporary arms control problems daunting. Fortunately, the experienced contributors to this volume have illuminated fundamental issues, both new and old. This forward-looking introduction will help a younger generation develop the more advanced, multidisciplinary skills required to reduce the risks inherent in today's volatile, globalized insecurity. These risk reduction skills, however, can only be honed with a deeper understanding of history, trends, and the backlash against those trends.

Arms control and cooperative security measures are not new. Nor has their substance and purpose been as narrowly focused as the renewed debate over final nuclear disarmament might suggest. Grand arms control negotiations of the Cold War, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), had their precedents in the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the 1920s and 1930s. Contemporary cooperative security measures have their antecedents in the 1958 Antarctic Treaty, but also in the "just war" restraints that shaped international law and diplomatic practice over many centuries. Efforts to prevent war or to restrain its destructiveness extend even further back in time. Even today, the roots of some customs and taboos within traditional societies can be traced back to the desire to restrain violence. From such simple practices emerged—concurrent with the evolution of nation-states, international organizations, and transnational

networks-extensive laws of warfare, diverse measures of cooperative restraint, numerous treaties, and several international arms control bodies.

By the end of the twentieth century, the study and practice of arms control and cooperative security had morphed into distinct subspecialties within a discipline, often called simply "arms control." Arms control was considered distinguishable from careers in the military, law, or diplomacy. Still, arms control and cooperative security cannot be isolated from these broader approaches and a wider context, nor can they reflect only arms control objectives. Their value is always measured by reference to broader security, economic, and political goals. Nation-states and nonstate actors shape and apply arms control and cooperative security measures to serve many different goals, both cooperative and competitive.

This ongoing manipulation of arms control concepts to serve multiple purposes extends to the very names that we employ for arms control and cooperative security. The contributors here offer a number of alternative nomenclatures and highlight the external political dynamics that are inevitably linked to arms control. Some prefer to use "arms control" as the all-encompassing term for both partial and comprehensive arms restraint. Others define arms control narrowly as applying only to limited, often pragmatic arrangements short of the total elimination of weapons. Frequently, the term is used even more narrowly, referring only to the negotiation of formal treaties, in contrast to more informal agreements and unilateral actions commonly labeled "cooperative" or "confidence-building." "Disarmament" was once the most widely used all-inclusive term, incorporating the elimination of weapons but also any partial measures toward that goal. This term fell out of favor as ideas such as general and complete disarmament (GCD) were seen as beyond the actionable time horizon of governments and were replaced by step-by-step processes driven more by immediate security needs, even when described as on the path toward distant goals.

Selecting nomenclature does send political signals. One sees this in the polarized distinctions between "nonproliferation" and "counterproliferation." Both are often used as comprehensive terms; but to the degree that nonproliferation is focused on prevention and counterproliferation on responses after proliferation, they quickly become competing priorities polarizing rather than synergistic. A new all-encompassing term such as "antiproliferation" might suggest a more optimal balance among the multitude of options, but the debate has not yet moved in that direction.

The entire field of arms control, disarmament, cooperative security, confidence building, peer engagement, and the like could be given a different umbrella moniker such as "international arms restraint," whether by treaty, law, or policy. A new descriptor might permit a richer taxonomy of options, for example, mapping different measures by the degree to which they are cooperative (from unilateral through negotiated to imposed sanc-

Preface

or the past fifteen years, the editors and most of the contributors to this volume have been involved in an ongoing study of the issues and trends that shape the contemporary arms control and cooperative security agenda. This book reflects our continued analysis of arms control and cooperative security and our considered judgment about the contributions they can make to national security. None of us believe that arms control or cooperative security initiatives are a panacea; they are best considered in conjunction with diplomacy, economic measures, and military power. Nevertheless, there is a renewed interest in devising ways to meet the challenges posed by globalization, the horizontal and vertical proliferation of dual-use technologies, and the threat posed by nonstate actors. There is a growing realization that arms control, cooperative security, and more ad hoc efforts to increase international transparency might constitute an appropriate response to the threats generated by informal networks and even individuals engaged in various illegal or nefarious activities.

The chapters in this book assess the role, value, and purpose of arms control and cooperative security. They explore arms control theory, arms control's successes and failures, changes to the international security environment in recent years, and the likelihood of future cooperative security arrangements or arms control agreements in various issue areas and geographic regions. The underlying principles and objectives of arms control remain relevant. Opportunities exist to devise new formal and informal international cooperative mechanisms to minimize and contain emerging security threats. Arms control may not be as paramount a diplomatic concern as it was during the last half of the twentieth century, but it still has a role to play in a globalizing world that has ongoing security concerns.

In addition to our authors, several other individuals played an important part in our project. We would first like to thank the commentators who participated in our authors' workshop held in Washington, DC, in April 2007:

Reb Benson; Cdr. Chris Bidwell, United States Navy; Beverly Dale; David Hamon; Peter Hays; Jo Husbands; David Jonas; Daryl Kimball; Kurt Klingenberger; Tim Miller; Lt. Col. Nancy Rower, United States Air Force; and Capt. Bob Vince, United States Navy. All of these discussants provided valuable feedback to our authors about their draft chapters, thereby immensely improving our volume. We also would like to thank David Saylor and the Navy Treaty Implementation Program not only for supporting our workshop on arms control, but for their continued support of our research programs on the future of arms control and cooperative security. And we are grateful to Lynne Rienner and her staff in Boulder for their continued belief in the importance of this topic.

We dedicate this volume to our colleague James M. Smith, who is also one of our authors. As the director of the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies for the past eleven years, he has done much to keep alive the concepts of arms control and cooperative security. Jim has hosted conferences and supported research on arms control, cooperative security, and nonproliferation topics. He also has ensured that there has been at least one panel on arms control at annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association to provide a venue for young scholars to explore the past, present, and future of cooperative security.

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—Jeffrey A. Larsen and James J. Wirtz